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Mitigating the Dual Liability of Newness and Foreignness in Capital Markets:  
The Role of Returnee Independent Directors 
Li W, Bruton GD and Filatotchev I, 
Abstract 
Foreign firms undergoing an initial public offering in developed economies face a 
dual liability of newness and foreignness that can negatively impact the firm’s ability 
to access capital. In this study, we examine the ability of returnee independent 
directors to overcome such a liability among 232 foreign listings in the U.S. We find 
that returnee independent directors positively impact the price premium of the foreign 
IPO. We also find that this relationship is contingent on the level of ownership 
retained by non-independent directors, the level of ownership retained by venture 
capitalists, and institutional factors in the firm’s country of origin. 
 
 
Keywords: returnee independent directors; liability of newness; liability of 
foreignness in capital markets; investor protection 
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Mitigating the Dual Liability of Newness and Foreignness in Capital 
Markets: The Role of Returnee Independent Directors 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have recognized that foreign companies often choose to list in stock 
exchanges in more developed economies such as the United States (U.S.) in order to 
obtain greater access to international capital (Hursti & Maula, 2007). Such firms face 
a dual liability of newness and foreignness in capital markets (Certo, 2003; Bell, 
Filatotchev, & Rasheed, 2012). They suffer a liability of newness as they have limited 
operational track records (Beatty & Zajac, 1997; Certo, 2003). They also have to 
overcome the liability of foreignness in capital markets as they are less familiar to 
host market investors and may face a foreign investors’ bias for firms from their home 
market (Bell et al., 2012; Humphery-Jenner & Suchard, 2013). As a result, foreign 
initial public offering (IPO) firms suffer from “legitimacy deficit” (Schmidt & Sofka, 
2009: 461), and thus must build their legitimacy, or the “generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” with the 
local investors as they seek an overseas listing (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). The question 
that arises, therefore, is: How do foreign IPO firms build legitimacy among stock 
market investors in developed economies?  
Prior studies grounded in agency perspective suggest several governance-related 
legitimation strategies that might help mitigate the disadvantages faced by IPO firms 
(Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2003), including inside ownership 
(Bell, Moore, & Al-Shammari, 2008), investment by venture capital (VC) firms 
(Bruton, Filatotchev, Cahine, & Wright, 2010; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Sanders & 
Boivie, 2004) and board independence (Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014; Bell et 
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al., 2012). Such governance-related legitimacy drivers represent strategies that both 
domestic and foreign firms undertaking an IPO can use to alleviate investors’ 
concerns (Certo, 2003; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Higgins & Gulati, 2006). Foreign 
IPO firms face not only liability of newness but also the additional liability of 
foreignness in capital markets. Therefore, this study examines legitimation actions 
specifically useful for this type of firms. Specifically, we examine hiring returnee 
independent directors as a legitimation strategy for foreign IPO firms. A returnee 
independent director is a native who had work experience or had a business degree 
from a university abroad before returning back home to join a local firm’s board. We 
argue that returnee independent directors serve as a “legitimacy bridge” that connects 
a foreign firm with its potential investors in a host capital market in a country where a 
returnee director has returned from. 
We further argue that the distance a foreign IPO needs to travel along this 
legitimacy bridge is not the same for all firms; rather, the legitimacy need depends on 
other firm-level governance characteristics and macro-institutional environment in the 
firm’s home country. Extant studies on legitimation processes tend to examine the 
various legitimization strategies separately, without paying attention to their 
substitutability or complementarities (e.g. Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2008). However, 
recently scholars have found that legitimation strategies should not be considered in 
isolation from each other as they might complement or substitute for each other in 
addressing stakeholders’ concerns (Li & McConomy, 2004). Indeed, Bell et al. (2012: 
120) have specifically called for studies to “evaluate how these legitimation strategies 
can complement or perhaps substitute for one another.” This study responds to this 
call and examines the interactive effects of legitimation strategies in overcoming dual 
liability of newness and foreignness in capital markets. Specifically, we examine a 
 4 
 
possible substitution between IPO valuation impacts of the returnee independent 
directors and two governance factors of an IPO firm: the retained ownership by 
non-independent directors and that of venture capital (VC) firms. These governance 
factors are traditionally associated with enhanced monitoring and incentive alignment 
processes in IPO firms and they may negatively moderate the effects of returnee 
independent directors. 
In addition, the effectiveness of legitimation strategies cannot be properly 
understood outside their institutional contexts (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; 
Scott, 2008). As Ahlstrom, Levitasm, Hitt, Dacin, & Zhu (2014: 572) argue: “Given 
the substantial variation in institutional environments, there is a need to better 
understand how different institutional arrangements help shape firm preferences and 
strategic choices”. Indeed, the effectiveness of a particular legitimation strategy in 
foreign capital markets can hinge upon the home institutional environments (Bell, et 
al., 2014). Bell et al. (2012: 119) proposed that “the impact of the institutional 
environment of a country on the likelihood of success of specific strategies...is a 
promising avenue for future research.” This study responds to this call by examining 
how different institutional arrangements in the firm’s host and home markets shape 
the effectiveness of returnee independent directors as a legitimation strategy. 
Our research makes a number of specific contributions to the literature. First, we 
contribute to research on the liability of newness and foreignness in capital markets. 
Specifically, we identify a legitimation strategy that is particularly important for 
foreign IPO firms, returnee independent directors on the firms’ boards, which has 
been largely overlooked by prior research. Second, we expand our understanding of 
legitimation strategies adopted by foreign IPO firms by examining their 
substitutability. In particular, we examine the substitutability between returnee 
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independent directors in foreign listed firms and the previously identified “good 
governance” practices for domestic firms, ownership retained by non-independent 
directors, and ownership retained by venture capitalists. Third, we delineate the 
boundary conditions of the legitimation strategies and explore how home country 
institutional arrangements shape the effectiveness of these strategies. Overall, we 
contribute to the literature on returnees and their impact on their home economies by 
examining their role in corporate governance. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Dual Liability of Newness and Foreignness in Capital Markets 
Scholars have long recognized that IPO firms face a liability of newness (Leland & 
Pyle, 1977). At the time of the IPOs, investors face tremendous uncertainty associated 
with the quality of the IPO firms, as these firms typically have limited operational 
track records and resources (Chen, Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008). In addition, investing 
in these firms is risky because these firms have not demonstrated their willingness and 
ability to protect investors’ interests (Certo, 2000; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). As a 
result of these risks and uncertainties, investors tend to place a discount on the IPO 
firms’ valuation (Filatotchev, Chahine & Bruton, 2016).  
In addition to the liability of newness, foreign listed firms also face the liability of 
foreignness in capital markets. The international business literature has long 
recognized that a firm experiences liabilities when they do business in areas other 
than their home market (Caves, 1971; Bhanjj & Oxley, 2013). Such a liability of 
foreignness can apply to both firms physically operating in a foreign market and those 
seeking capital in foreign markets (Bell et al., 2012). Scholars have offered a wide 
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variety of reasons for the presence of liability of foreignness in capital markets, 
including institutional distance between a home and a host country (Chan, Covrig, & 
Ng, 2005), the cultural distance between a home and a host country (Beugelsdijk & 
Frijns, 2010), host market investors’ information costs (Kang & Stulz, 1997), and 
host-market investors’ unfamiliarity with foreign IPO firms (Sarkissian & Schill, 
2004). In particular, for foreign IPO firms, the biggest concern for investors is that 
protection of their interests might be less in a foreign country than in their home 
country (Bell et al., 2012; Moore, Bell, & Filatotchev, 2010).  
Prior studies highlight that foreign IPO firms could mitigate their dual liability, 
and build legitimacy in the eyes of foreign investors, by sending signals of firm 
quality (Bell et al., 2012). Research has found that whereas domestic IPO firms used 
governance-related signals, such as enhanced monitoring and incentive alignment to 
overcome the liability of newness, foreign IPO firms can also adopt these strategies to 
address investors’ concerns (Bell et al., 2008; 2014). However, to the extent that 
foreign IPO firms face additional challenges concerning the liability of foreignness in 
capital market, an investigation of legitimation strategies which are particularly 
effective for such firms is an important area for research.  
 
Returnee Independent Directors as a Legitimation Factor 
We propose that returnee independent directors could serve as a signal of high firm 
quality, and thus enhance a foreign listed firm’s legitimacy. An effective signal of firm 
quality that impacts the firm’s legitimacy has two chief characteristics: observability 
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and cost (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). 
First, observability refers to whether outsiders, in this case foreign investors, are 
able to notice the legitimacy signal of the company undergoing the IPO outside their 
home economy. In order to undertake an IPO, the owners and managers must prepare 
a standard set of documents for potential investors, particularly the firm’s prospectus. 
In the prospectus, a firm must include biographical information on all the directors 
(Certo, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2006). For the foreign firms, a unique aspect of a 
director’s background is whether the director is a returnee, or an individual who has 
worked or received education overseas and has now returned to his or her home 
country. Hence, potential investors are highly likely to be aware of the backgrounds of 
the returnee independent directors.  
Second, high legitimacy signal costs imply that firms with high quality are in a 
better position than those with low quality to absorb those costs (Connelly et al., 
2011). The costs concerning returnee independent directors include the time and effort 
associated with searching for and recruiting a returnee to serve as an independent 
director, as well as potentially high compensation paid to the returnee independent 
director. As the globalization intensifies, firms are increasingly experiencing 
competition from multinational enterprises, and more and more firms are embarking 
on internationalization (Peng, Sun, & Markoczy, 2015). Since returnees tend to have 
more overseas experience and overseas network resources (Filatotchev, Liu, Buck, & 
Wright, 2009; Li, Zhang, Li, Zhou, & Zhang, 2012; Liu, Lu, Filatotcheve, Buck, & 
Wright, 2010), they are likely to receive high compensation when being hired as 
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independent directors (Peng et al., 2015). For example, in their study of foreign 
directors in Chinese companies, Giannetti, Liao, and Yu (2015: 1634) indicate that the 
returnee board members enjoy various monetary and non-monetary incentives 
including subsidized housing, schooling for the children of the returnees, medical 
benefits, jobs for spouses, and long-term residence permits. Our detailed analysis of 
director compensation in the prospectuses of the foreign firms listed in U.S. reveals 
that returnee independent directors typically receive higher compensation compared 
to local independent directors. For example, among the four independent directors of 
Perfect World, a Chinese firm listed in U.S., only a returnee independent director 
receives an equity-based compensation in addition to cash payments, whereas other 
three local independent directors do not own any shares. 
Though all IPO firms will likely find returnee independent directors costly to hire, 
high quality firms are in a better position to absorb the associated costs (Connelly et 
al., 2011). Prior studies suggest that only high quality firms are able to attract 
returnees to join their boards. As Giannetti et al. (2015: 1630) put it: “Since 
individuals with foreign experience are scarce, not all firms with similarly high 
demand for directors with foreign experience are able to attract one”. Similarly, 
Filatotchev et al. (2016) argue that a primary motivation to accept a board seat by a 
non-CEO director is establishing and/or maintaining membership in the corporate 
elite. As returnee directors are concerned with preserving their reputation, higher 
quality IPO firms should have an easier time recruiting other prestigious actors.  
Overall, to the extent that hiring returnee independent directors is observable and 
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costly, especially for low quality firms, it serves as a strong legitimacy signal 
indicating firm quality to potential foreign investors. 
Hiring returnee independent directors is also an activating signal of legitimacy as 
it can serve to bring about good governance and ensuring investors’ interests protected 
(Connelly et al., 2011). The returnee independent directors are unique in that they 
understand both the home market where a firm has its headquarter and principal 
operations and, having worked or received education in the foreign market where the 
listing will occur, they have an understanding of that market also. Thus, such directors 
are well placed to bridge firms and investors in different nations, ensuring the values 
of the foreign investors are understood and that the ability to navigate the local market 
of the listing firm is also present. In recent study of the roles of foreign directors in 
China, Giannetti et al. (2015) argue that directors with foreign experience may 
facilitate the adoption of superior management practices aimed at enhancing firm 
performance and productivity. More importantly, these authors suggest that “directors 
with foreign experience may be more effective at performing the monitoring function 
and improving firm-level corporate governance” (Giannetti et al., 2015: 1630).   
Indeed, recent studies of the roles of directors with foreign experience provide 
empirical support to these theoretical arguments. For example, Ma and Khanna (2015) 
found that in China, compared to those without foreign experience, independent 
directors with foreign experience are more likely to issue disagreement or abstention 
opinion reports. Using a large sample of Chinese companies, Giannetti et al. (2015) 
provide robust empirical evidence that returnee directors are associated with an 
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increase in the firm’s valuation and its total factor productivity. 
 In addition, research grounded in institutional perspective suggests that in a 
highly uncertain environment associated with an IPO, board characteristics are a 
product not only of coordinative demands imposed by the market efficiency concerns 
but also of norms legitimizing the adoption of appropriate governance practices 
(Filatotchev et al., 2016). Following Deephouse and Suchman (2008), these 
researchers argue that having returnee independent directors on the focal IPO board 
indicates to overseas investors three measures of legitimacy: pragmatic (returnee 
directors’ competence), moral (returnee directors’ propriety associated with their 
exposure to norms and rules in developed economies), and cognitive (returnee 
directors’ ability to “bridge” cognitive differences in home and host countries). These 
theoretical perspectives highlight that returnee independent directors are a potential 
observable legitimacy driver that can reduce the impact of a foreign IPO’s dual 
liabilities in host capital markets.  
In sum, hiring returnee directors not only separates high quality firms from low 
quality firms, but also is essential to bring about good governance. Such legitimacy 
signals of firm quality can help to mitigate the dual liability of newness and 
foreignness in capital markets, and is thus an effective legitimation strategy enhancing 
IPO valuation. We thus offer the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Returnee independent directors have a positive impact on IPO 
valuation for firms listed in a foreign stock exchange.  
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Alternative Legitimation Strategies 
Our arguments suggest that presence of returnee independent directors may alleviate 
liabilities of newness and foreignness associated with foreign IPOs and, in turn, 
improve the firm’s valuations in the host capital markets. However, having 
independent returnee directors has its cost-benefit trade-offs, and the organizational 
impact of returnees should be considered in conjunction with alternative legitimation 
strategies. Bell et al. (2014: 302) points out that “scholars should not consider 
corporate governance mechanisms in isolation from each other, but should instead 
look at them in “bundles” when determining their overall legitimacy impact, because 
mechanisms can be functionally equivalent”. Indeed, in line with Aguilera, 
Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson (2008), we argue that prior research on IPO 
performance overstates the functionality of governance within IPO firms and, perhaps, 
fails to recognize the possible substitution effects among governance practices. This 
makes a constellation of governance practices an element of strategic choice; a view 
that represents a significant departure from the traditional agency perspective that 
considers governance practices as parts of a standard “toolkit” each IPO firm should 
possess if it is to impress investors and achieve high performance. In other words, 
when multiple legitimation strategies play similar and redundant roles, then these 
strategies might substitute for one another, as each additional legitimation strategy has 
limited value for the IPO firms (Bell et al., 2014; Ozmel et al., 2013).  
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 Following this logic, we argue that presence of strong internal governance 
mechanisms associated with enhanced monitoring and incentives may substitute for 
the valuation effects of returnee independent directors, for two reasons. First, when a 
foreign IPO firm already signals its quality through a certain legitimation strategy, it 
reduces the uncertainty concerning the firm’s value. Indeed, these strategies all are 
legitimacy signals of a foreign IPO firm’s unobservable quality. As a result, the 
amount of uncertainty that an additional legitimate strategy can reduce would be finite, 
and the effectiveness of returnee independent directors in improving valuations would 
be weakened (Bell et al., 2014; Ozmel et al., 2013).  
Second, it can be costly for firms to simultaneously send different types of 
legitimacy signals of firm quality. To the extent that a particular type of legitimacy 
signal, such as improving internal monitoring and incentives, is sufficient in signaling 
a firm’s underlying quality, sending additional legitimacy signals of firm quality by 
hiring returnee independent directors can be inefficient, since a firm has already borne 
the signaling cost (Hsu, 2004; Ozmel et al., 2013). Hence, because these legitimation 
strategies can bring about similar legitimacy benefits and each of the strategies is 
itself costly, we argue that the legitimacy signals generated by ownership retained by 
non-independent directors and ownership retained by venture capitalists weaken the 
effects of hiring returnee independent directors. In the following sections, we extend 
these arguments and explain the underlying socio-economic mechanisms behind these 
substitution effects. Following prior studies (e.g, Bell et al., 2014, Filatotchev et al., 
2016; Aguilera et al., 2008), we associate these enhanced governance practices with 
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ownership retained by non-independent directors and ownership retained by venture 
capitalists.  
Ownership Retained by Non-independent Directors.  
Apart from independent directors, corporate boards of foreign IPOs include 
non-independent directors that include executives, and affiliated directors linked to 
the IPO firm through various commercial and family relationships. Prior research 
indicates that these non-independent directors often side with the executives, reducing, 
therefore, the overall monitoring capacity of the firm’s board (Daily, Johnson, & 
Dalton, 1999) and undermining investors’ perceptions of the quality of its governance.  
However, high ownership stake retained by non-independent directors sends 
positive legitimacy signals of firm quality to potential investors (Bell et al., 2008). 
Non-independent directors tend to have private information on firm quality 
(Filatotcheve & Bishop, 2002). As a result, non-independent directors of high quality 
firms are likely to retain shares, since when they incorporate their private information 
of the IPO firms in the aftermarket share price, they can benefit from a higher 
valuation of their retained shares (Bruton et al., 2010). For this reason, when the 
non-independent directors are retaining shares, they send a legitimacy signal of the 
firm’s quality by communicating private favorable information to potential investors. 
In addition, by retaining equity, the interests of non-independent directors and 
investors are aligned. Ownership retained by non-independent directors thus also 
serves to reduce conflicts in principal-agent relationships (Filatotchev & Bishop, 
2002).  
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We propose that returnee independent directors and ownership retained by 
non-independent directors substitute for each other in alleviating investors’ concerns 
over foreign IPO firms. When non-independent directors retain high levels of 
ownership, potential foreign investors could tell that the firms are of high quality, and 
thus rely less on the presence of returnee independent directors as legitimacy signals 
(Bell et al., 2014; Pollock et al., 2010). In addition, simultaneously sending these two 
types of legitimacy signals can increase the signaling costs of the focal firms. 
Therefore, ownership retained by non-independent directors mitigates the positive 
effect of hiring returnee independent directors. We thus offer the following 
hypothesis:  
     
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of a returnee independent director on IPO 
valuation for firms listed in a foreign stock exchange is weaker for firms with 
high retained ownership by non-independent directors 
 
Ownership Retained by Venture Capitalists.  
Ownership retained by venture capitalists is another signal of the quality of the IPO 
firms. Venture capitalists typically have a strong incentive to develop a trustworthy 
reputation so as to gain future access to the IPO market (Celikyurt, Sevilir, & 
Shivdasani, 2014; Chemmanur, Krishnan, & Nandy, 2011; Megginson & Weiss, 1991). 
As a result, they are reluctant to provide support to low quality firms, as association 
with these firms might damage the venture capitalists’ reputation (Connelly et al., 
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2011). Thus, by retaining high levels of ownership of an IPO firm, venture capitalists 
send the signal that maintaining their investment is worthwhile (Bruton et al., 2010; 
Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). In addition, retained ownership 
also provides venture capitalists the incentives to closely monitor the management, 
and thus serves to mitigate the potential of agency problems (Sapienza, Manigart, & 
Vermeir, 1996).      
Ownership retained by venture capitalists mitigates information asymmetries 
associated with the IPO firm newness, and thus should substitute for returnee 
independent directors on the board in alleviating the investors’ concerns. When 
venture capitalists have retained high levels of ownership in a foreign IPO firm and 
hence differentiated the firm from others having less attractive prospects, the investors 
face a lower level of risk of investment. Therefore, the value of hiring returnee 
independent directors decreases. Furthermore, as the firms in which venture capitalists 
have retained high levels of ownership have borne the legitimacy signaling costs, 
hiring returnee independent directors can be inefficient (Ozmel et al., 2013). As a 
result, the positive effect of hiring returnee independent directors on IPO valuation for 
firms listed in a foreign stock exchange will diminish. We thus offer the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of a returnee independent director on IPO 
valuation for firms listed in a foreign stock exchange is weaker for firms with 
high venture capital retained ownership. 
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Home Country Institutional Environment 
Recent studies on the role of institutional context suggest that whether a strategy can 
result in desired outcomes is contingent on the institutional arrangements of a country 
(Peng et al., 2009). As Ahlstrom et al. (2014: 573) point out: “Today it is broadly 
accepted that firms are affected by the broad socio-political and economic context in 
which they are embedded”. In more recent paper Hitt, Li & Xu (2016) explore the 
effects of the home/host country institutional environment on MNEs’ strategies, such 
as which countries/markets to enter and the mode of entry, but their analysis is 
focused predominantly on product markets. In the context of foreign IPOs, Bell et al. 
(2014: 304) suggest a nested legitimacy theoretical framework according to which 
“the process of legitimation may be contingent on the institutional environment within 
which a firm operates.”  
We extend this research and suggest that a promising avenue of inquiry is to 
examine the impact of the institutional environment of the IPO firm’s home country 
on the likelihood of success of returnee independent directors to overcome the 
liability of foreignness in capital market. Here we focus on investor protection in 
home market as the key institutional environment influencing the effectiveness of 
returnee independent directors as a legitimation strategy.  
In societies with strong investor protection, the local legal institutions provide the 
protection of the interests of minority shareholders such that the independent directors 
may have lesser pressures to monitor and discipline the management (Firth, Fung, & 
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Rui, 2006). Indeed, prior studies revealed that investor protection would reduce the 
scale and scope of managerial opportunism. For example, using a sample of 21,483 
firm-year observations in 33 countries from 1997 through 2001, DeFond and Hung 
(2004) found that strong investor protection significantly strengthens the association 
between poor performance and subsequent CEO turnover, a key indicator of effective 
corporate governance. Potential foreign investors in firms from such societies, thus, 
would have less concern over the investment risks and rely less on returnee 
independent directors as a signal of firm quality.  
In contrast, in societies with few investor protection laws, large shareholders may 
extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders in what is called the 
principal-principal problem (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; 
2000; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Foreign investors thus may 
hesitate to invest in firms that originate from such societies. In such circumstances, 
hiring returnee independent directors becomes particularly important to the foreign 
firms to overcome the liability of newness and foreignness in capital markets as it 
serves as a legitimacy signal ensuring the investors that their interests will be well 
protected (Van Essen, Van Oosterhout, & Carney, 2012). We thus offer the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The positive effect of a returnee independent director on IPO 
valuation for firms listed in a foreign stock exchange is weaker for firms from 
countries with strong investor protection. 
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To summarize, we suggest that the impact of returnee independent directors on 
investor perceptions of foreign IPOs is far from being universal, and it depends on a 
number of firm- and country-level contingency factors that moderate this relationship. 
Our resulting theoretical model is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
METHODS 
Sample Selection 
We drew our sample of firms from the entire population of foreign IPOs listed on 
NYSE and NASDAQ between 2000 and 2013. Consistent with prior studies on 
foreign IPOs listing (Bell et al., 2008; Moore, Bell, Filatotchev, & Rasheed, 2012), we 
used Thomson Financial Security Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database to 
identify all foreign firms that made IPOs in the U.S. markets. According to this 
database, foreign IPOs account for 15.27% of all IPOs in the U.S. markets. Bell et al. 
(2012) noted that host country institutions might also have an impact on the 
effectiveness of a legitimation strategy. In this study, we focus on foreign IPOs in a 
single country (i.e., the U.S.) in order to control for the effect of institutional 
environment of the host country. 
 We examine the actual prospectus of each IPO to ensure that it was not listed on 
any exchanges, including in its home country, prior to its U.S. IPO. Consistent with 
prior IPO research, we excluded from the sample 57 firms whose stock listing resulted 
from mergers or acquisitions, spin-offs of publicly listed firms, issuance of units, 
warrants, and rights offerings. In addition, we excluded from the analysis U.S. 
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financial service firms incorporated in Bermuda, the Bahamas, and the Cayman 
Islands. This results in a sample size of 232 firms. Table 1 provides sample 
characteristics. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable. We measured investor IPO valuations by price premium. This 
variable represents the potential value that investors perceive in an issuing firm’s 
shares that exceeds their book value. Recent studies have emphasized the advantages 
of this proxy of investor perceptions of an IPO firm’s value compared to other IPO 
valuation measures such as IPO underpricing (Bell et al., 2014). Therefore, we 
measured the price premium as (offer price – book value)/offer price. Offer price is 
the value of the firm’s equity as reported in the prospectus.  
Independent and moderating variables. A returnee is a native who had work 
experience in U.S. or had a business degree from U.S. universities. We did not count 
as a returnee if a native went back to home country immediately after getting a 
non-business degree from a U.S. university since he or she had very limited exposure 
to U.S. business practices. The Returnee independent directors variable was measured 
as the percentage of returnee independent directors in the board of directors. That is, 
we calculated it as the number of returnee independent directors divided by the total 
number of board directors.  
 Ownership retained by non-independent directors was measured as the 
percentage of a company’s shares held by non-independent directors after offering. 
 Venture capital (VC) ownership we measured as the percentage of a company’s 
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shares held by venture capital firms. The information on the ownership structure of 
the companies is collected from listing prospectuses. We examined each of the major 
shareholders of these companies and coded whether it is a venture capital firm or not 
both by searching its background information on the Internet and by using venture 
capital directory in the SDC dataset.  
La Porta et al. (2000) defined investor protection as the protection of minority 
outside shareholders by the firm’s home country regulations and laws. We measured 
investor protection by using the revised anti-director index provided by Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Selanes, & Shleifer, (2008). This index has six sub-indexes covering 
six areas: (1) vote by mail; (2) obstacles to the actual exercise of the right to vote; (3) 
minority representation on the board of directors through cumulative voting or 
proportional representation; (4) an oppressed minority mechanism to seek redress in 
case of expropriation; (5) pre-emptive rights to subscribe to new securities issued by 
the company; and (6) right to call a special shareholder meeting. This index ranges 
from 0 to 6, with higher scores representing stronger investor protection. We utilize 
the overall index to assess investor protection levels in the countries represented in 
this study. 
Control variables. We control for a number of factors that could potentially impact 
our results. Specifically, following previous research, we controlled for firm-level 
variables shown to impact financial performance of IPO firms, including firm age, 
size, and past financial performance. We operationalized firm age as the difference 
between the date of the IPO and the IPO firm’s founding date. Firm size was 
operationalized as the natural log of market capitalization in thousand U.S. dollars. A 
dummy variable, coded as 1 if the operating performance in the year prior to IPO is 
positive and 0 otherwise, is used to control for past financial performance. We control 
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for international sales, which might affect the performance of firms in a foreign 
capital market (Bell et al., 2008). This variable was measured as the percentage of 
revenues generated outside of home country. We also control for underwriter 
reputation. We measure underwriter reputation using an index developed by Loughran 
and Ritter (1997). This index does not provide underwriter reputation of underwriters 
for the period of 2012 to 2013. We thus used the underwriters’ reputation in previous 
two years (2010 to 2011) as proxies of their reputation in 2012 and 2013.  
Further, we control for firm risk at the time of the IPO by summing the number of 
risk factors listed in a foreign firm’s prospectus. In addition, high-tech firms might be 
appreciated by investors on U.S. exchanges (Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). 
Therefore, following Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, (2003), we controlled for this effect 
by using a dummy variable indicating whether the IPO firms operates in a high-tech 
industry or not. In line with Loughran and Ritter (2004), high-tech firms are those in 
industries of computer hardware, communication equipment, electronics, navigation 
equipment, measuring and controlling devices, medical instruments, telephone 
equipment, communication services, and software.  
 Further, we control for cultural distance between market in which the firm lists 
and the home market. Following Kogut and Singh (1988), we first calculate 
composite index based on the deviation along each of the four cultural dimensions 
from the U.S. ranking. We then measure cultural distance as a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the value of the index is above the mean, and 0 otherwise.  
We include a number of control variables related to corporate governance. We 
control for the independent director ratio measured as the percentage of board 
directors who are independent directors. Dual leadership is a dummy variable, coded 
as 1 if the CEO also served as the board chairman, and 0 otherwise. We measure 
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institutional ownership as the percentage of shares held by institutional investors. 
Additionally, we control for the founder ratio measured as the percentage of founders 
on a firm’s board of directors. We also control for possible monitoring effect of top 
auditors employing a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the IPO firm hires the audit 
service of a big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for returnee executive 
directors. We measure returnee executive directors as the number of returnee 
executive directors divided by the total number of board directors.   
 We also control for the bubble period of rapid growth which can affect valuation 
using Bubble dummy. This variable is equal to 1 if the IPO occurred in year 2000, and 
zero otherwise. In addition, stock market conditions change over time, and there are 
periods when IPO investors exhibit over-optimism. We thus use a market return 
variable to control for high market inflows immediately prior to the IPO. Following 
Chahine, Arthurs, Filatotchev, and Hoskisson (2012), we measure this variable as the 
buy-and-hold return of Value Weighted CRSP Index during the one-month period 
prior to the IPO date. Further, we control for U.S. sales ratio. We measured the U.S. 
sales ratio as the percentage of revenues generated from U.S. markets and obtained 
this information from company prospectus. Finally, in the analyses we also control for 
industry, issue period, and home country effects by including industry, year of listing, 
and home country dummies. 
 
RESULTS 
We test our hypotheses using ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis. Table 2 
shows descriptive statistics for the sample of foreign IPOs. The magnitude of 
correlations between independent variables was in the range of low to medium, 
suggesting that multicollinearity could be a problem in the testing of hypotheses. To 
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address this issue, we inspect variance inflation factors (VIFs) in our regression 
models. The VIFs were well within the limit of 10, indicating that multicollinearity 
did not have an undue influence on the estimations. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 We report the hypotheses testing results in Table 3. Model 1 in Table 3 is the 
baseline model, which includes only control variables. The first hypothesis predicts a 
positive relationship between returnee independent director and price premium. 
Model 2 in Table 3 shows the results of testing this hypothesis by adding the variable 
of returnee independent director to the baseline model. As expected, returnee 
independent director has a positive impact on price premium. The effect was 
statistically significant (p<0.05). Therefore, our findings support Hypothesis 1.  
 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 Model 3 in Table 3 presents the results of testing Hypothesis 2, which predicted 
that the positive effect of returnee independent director on price premium is weaker 
for firms with high ownership retained by non-independent directors. As predicted, 
the coefficient of the interaction between ownership retained by non-independent 
directors and returnee independent directors was significant (p<0.01) and negative. 
Figure 2 presents the moderating effect. Following the procedure proposed by Aiken 
and West (1991) and Jaccard and Turrisi (2003), we perform simple slope tests to 
examine the relationship between returnee independent directors and price premium 
when non-independent directors retained low and high levels of firm ownership. The 
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simple slope tests show that the returnee independent directors variable is 
significantly and positively associated with price premium (β=0.16; p<0.01) when 
non-independent directors retained low levels of firm ownership (i.e., a retained 
ownership by non-independent directors that is 1 standard deviation above the mean 
retained ownership). In contrast, the relationship between returnee independent 
directors and price premium is insignificant (β=0.01; n.s.) when non-independent 
directors retained high levels of firm ownership (i.e., a retained ownership by 
non-independent directors that is 1 standard deviation above the mean retained 
ownership). Therefore, our findings support Hypothesis 2.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Model 4 in Table 3 presents the results for Hypothesis 3 which suggests that the 
positive effect of returnee independent director on price premium is weaker for firms 
with high venture capital retained ownership. As we predict, the coefficient of the 
interaction between venture capital retained ownership and returnee independent 
director was marginally significant (p<0.10) and negative. Figure 3 illustrates the 
moderating effect. A simple slope test shows that the returnee independent directors 
variable is significantly and positively associated with price premium (β=0.14; p<0.01) 
when venture capitalists retained low levels of firm ownership (i.e., a retained 
ownership by venture capitalists that is 1 standard deviation below the mean retained 
ownership). In contrast, the relationship between returnee independent directors and 
price premium is not significant (β=0.01; n.s.) when venture capitalists retained high 
levels of firm ownership (i.e., a retained ownership by venture capitalists that is 1 
standard deviation above the mean retained ownership). Therefore, our findings 
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marginally support Hypothesis 3. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Model 5 in Table 3 presents the results for Hypothesis 4 which predicts that the 
positive effect of returnee independent director on price premium is weaker for firms 
from countries with strong investor protection. As predicted, the coefficient of the 
interaction between investor protection and returnee independent director is 
significant (p<0.01) and negative. Figure 4 illustrates the moderating effect. A simple 
slope test shows that returnee independent directors is significantly and positively 
associated with price premium (β=0.12; p<0.01) in low investor protection countries 
(i.e., an investor protection that is 1 standard deviation below the mean investor 
protection). In contrast, the relationship between the returnee independent directors 
variable and price premium is not significant (β=-0.02; n.s.) in high investor 
protection countries (i.e., an investor protection that is 1 standard deviation above the 
mean investor protection). Therefore, our findings support Hypothesis 4.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
Model 5 in Table 3 shows the results of simultaneously testing Hypotheses 2, 3, 
and 4. The results are similar to those reported in Models 3 and 4.  In summary, we 
find support for all four hypotheses.    
 
Robustness tests 
Though the VIFs of the models in Table 3 were well within the limit of 10, suggesting 
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that multicollinearity did not have an undue influence on the hypotheses testing 
results, some of the variables in the regression models are correlated with each other. 
In particular, the correlation coefficients among independent director ratio, returnee 
executive directors, and returnee independent directors are high. In Table 4, we 
excluded independent director ratio and returnee executive directors from the 
regression models. The results in this Table are basically the same as those reported in 
Table 3. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
We provide another robustness test to ensure that the empirical results are not 
sensitive to the IPO bubble period. More specifically, we rerun the analyses using data 
from year 2001 to year 2013, dropping firms listed in year 2000. The results are 
reported in Table 5. The results are qualitatively the same as those shown in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
DISCUSSION 
We demonstrate in this study that returnee independent directors serve as a key means 
by which foreign IPO firms build legitimacy in the eyes of foreign investors. 
Attracting returnee independent directors thus represents an effective legitimation 
strategy for overcoming the dual liability of newness and foreignness in capital 
markets, particularly when ownership retained by non-independent directors and 
ownership retained by venture capitalists are low, and when the firms originate from 
societies with weak investor protection.  
 This study makes several important contributions. First, our findings strengthen 
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the theoretical understanding of the dual liability of newness and foreignness in 
capital market. While scholars have long recognized a liability of foreignness as 
foreigners enter new markets, to date most of the research has focused on the 
challenges faced by firms in product markets (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). This 
research expands the work by Bell et al. (2012), which recognizes that this same 
liability of foreignness exists in capital markets by suggesting that foreign IPO firms 
suffer both the liability of newness and the liability of foreignness in capital markets. 
Departing from prior studies focused on domestic IPO firms, we propose that returnee 
independent directors can serve as a legitimation strategy that is particularly effective 
for foreign IPO firms. Our study thus enriches our understanding of how firms can 
develop more effective strategies when accessing resources in foreign capital markets. 
 Secondly, this study contributes to the literature on legitimation strategies by 
examining the substitutability of different legitimation strategies. Prior studies on 
legitimation strategies tend to consider the strategies in isolation. However, these 
legitimation strategies can substitute for each other, as they serve the same purpose of 
signaling legitimacy (Li & McConomy, 2004). We propose and provide empirical 
evidence that returnee independent directors (a legitimation strategy that is 
particularly effective in mitigating dual liability) and ownership retained by 
non-independent directors and venture capitalists (legitimation strategies firms can 
use to mitigate newness) substitute for each other in mitigating foreign investors’ 
concerns over firm quality. These empirical findings thus help delineate the 
interactive relationships among legitimation strategies.  
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 Thirdly, we bring into the understanding of legitimation strategies boundaries the 
recognition that the effectiveness of a legitimation strategy is contingent on the 
institutional environment of the home country. The broad literature on firm strategies 
suggests that the success of a specific strategy is a function of the institutional 
characteristics (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; 2014; Hitt et al., 2016; Liu, Wang, Zhao, & 
Ahlstrom, 2013). However, to date scholars have largely not examined how 
institutional arrangements might shape the effectiveness of legitimation strategies 
used to addressing investors’ concerns. Our study pushes the literature forward by 
highlighting that investor protection can shape the effectiveness of the legitimation 
strategy used to overcome dual liability of newness and foreignness in capital 
markets.  
 Finally, we contribute to the research on returnees. Prior studies focus mainly on 
returnee entrepreneurs (Liu, Lu, & Choi, 2014). According to these studies, returnees’ 
human capital and social capital accumulated from their foreign experience might 
help achieve better firm performance (Filatotchev et al., 2009). The results of this 
study complement prior empirical findings by suggesting that returnees can signal a 
firm’s legitimacy by serving as independent directors. Indeed, the results in Table 3 
reveal that returnee independent directors play a more important role in influencing 
foreign IPO price premium that returnee executive directors do. Hence, our results 
enrich research on returnees by suggesting that they can play an important role in 
mitigating the dual liability of newness and foreignness in capital markets.   
 Our study has managerial implications as well. From the perspective of 
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companies undertaking IPOs in a foreign capital market, our results suggest that it is 
beneficial for high quality firms to have returnee independent directors. This 
legitimation strategy is especially important when the non-independent directors and 
the venture capitalists retain no or low levels of ownership at the time of IPO. Indeed, 
not all directors and venture capitalists are willing to retain a high level of ownership 
of the IPO firms. Instead, they might take the opportunity of foreign IPO to exit and 
pursue other opportunities subsequently. In such circumstances, the high quality IPO 
firms might be able to differentiate themselves from other companies by having 
returnee independent directors.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
The limitations of this study open new opportunities for research. First, this study has 
examined the largest market for foreign IPOs – the U.S. However, the U.S. is not the 
only capital market attracting foreign IPOs, and future research should expand the 
understanding of foreign capital acquisition to other major financial centers such as 
London and other European capital markets.  
 In addition, we rely on archival data and thus have less information about how 
foreign investors make sense of the legitimation strategies. Hence, more concrete 
information about how investors, in particular institutional investors, perceive the 
value of returnee independent directors may lead to a better understanding of the 
effectiveness of legitimation strategies (Abrahamson, 2008). 
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CONCLUSION 
How can IPO firms build their legitimacy in foreign capital markets? The empirical 
results show that hiring returnee independent directors serve as a legitimation strategy 
that help a foreign IPO firm mitigate the dual liability of newness and foreignness in 
capital markets. Such a legitimation strategy is particularly effective when the level of 
ownership retained by non-independent directors is low, when the level of ownership 
retained by venture capitalists is low, or when the firms comes from a nation with 
weak investor protection. This study thus has made theoretical contributions to a 
better understanding of the legitimation strategies that firms can use in foreign capital 
markets. We hope that the foundation laid in this study will help to build a substantive 
new stream of research around both returnee independent directors and the dual 
liability of newness and foreignness in capital markets.  
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Table 1 Foreign IPO home markets 
Origin of IPO firm Foreign IPOs on U.S. exchanges 
Asia/pacific 150 
Europe 38 
Middle East/Africa 27 
Latin America 8 
North America 9 
BRIC countries
a 
142 
 
Issuing year Foreign IPOs on U.S. exchanges 
2000 10 
2001 3 
2002 2 
2003 3 
2004 21 
2005 22 
2006 22 
2007 41 
2008 7 
2009 11 
2010 46 
2011 18 
2012 8 
2013 18 
 
Industry Characteristics Foreign IPOs on U.S. exchanges 
Mining 2 
Construction 3 
Manufacturing 86 
Transportation and public utility 33 
Wholesale trade 2 
Retail trade 8 
Finance, insurance, real estate 10 
Service 86 
Other 2 
a
 BRIC countries are Brazil, Russia, India, and China.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations
a,b 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1.Percent price premium 0.70  0.19                     
2. Firm age 9.39  13.09  0.09                    
3. Market capitalization 11.72  1.19  -0.01  0.03                   
4. Past finance performance 1.28  18.51  -0.03  -0.02  -0.10                  
5. International sales 0.29 0.39 -0.05  0.07  -0.07  -0.05                 
6. Number of risk factors 51.25  13.60  -0.12  -0.18  0.11  0.10  -0.28                
7. Underwriter reputation 0.09  0.08  0.15  -0.01  0.37  -0.08  -0.11  0.19               
8. Year 2000 0.06  0.24  0.09  -0.07  -0.08  -0.02  0.05  -0.38  0.01              
9. High tech Industry 0.60  0.49  0.21  -0.10  -0.08  -0.08  0.09  -0.01  0.07  0.13             
10. Cultural distance 2.57  1.05  -0.23  -0.31  0.16  0.04  -0.27  0.48  0.07  -0.29  -0.06            
11. Top auditor 0.88  0.33  0.23  0.08  0.33  -0.18  0.18  0.00  0.41  -0.02  0.24  -0.15           
12. Independent director ratio 0.45  0.21  -0.08  -0.09  -0.04  0.04  0.13  0.07  -0.23  -0.29  -0.12  0.02  -0.16          
13. Dual leadership 0.53  0.50  0.02  -0.12  -0.01  0.06  -0.04  0.14  0.04  -0.12  0.06  0.27  -0.03  0.08         
14. Market return 0.02  0.04  0.10  0.04  0.07  -0.10  0.01  0.06  0.07  0.00  0.04  -0.07  0.09  -0.04  -0.14        
15. US sales ratio 0.10  0.21  0.12  0.10  -0.25  -0.03  0.62  -0.25  -0.09  0.16  0.20  -0.38  0.13  0.04  -0.04  0.01       
16. Ownership retained by 
non-independent directors 
34.58  27.64  0.01  -0.13  -0.07  0.02  -0.22  0.22  0.02  -0.05  -0.10  0.30  -0.24  -0.11  0.11  -0.01  -0.19      
17. VC retained ownership 17.80  20.57  0.36  -0.08  0.05  -0.06  0.11  0.14  0.23  -0.07  0.20  -0.18  0.31  0.01  0.05  0.10  0.19  -0.08     
18. Investor protection 2.22  1.54  0.15  0.26  -0.09  -0.05  0.36  -0.57  -0.09  0.31  0.03  -0.71  0.17  -0.07  -0.32  0.00  0.40  -0.34  0.08    
19. Returnee executive directors 0.15  0.30  0.05  -0.09  0.02  -0.04  0.03  0.13  0.07  -0.01  0.24  0.11  0.13  -0.01  0.03  0.04  0.04  -0.12  0.10  -0.10   
20.Returnee independent directors 0.17  0.26  0.10  -0.10  -0.05  0.02  -0.13  0.19  0.09  -0.10  0.03  0.21  0.07  -0.06  0.04  0.04  -0.09  0.13  0.07  -0.20  0.17  
a
 n=232 observations.  
b
 correlations greater than 0.13 or less than -0.13 are significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test). 
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Table 3 Factors affecting foreign IPOs’ percent price premiuma,b 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.452 0.424 0.317 0.488 0.441 0.385 
 (0.473) (0.463) (0.460) (0.468) (0.448) (0.453) 
1. Firm age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
2. Market capitalization 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.008 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) 
3. Past financial performance 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.007 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
4. International sales 0.047 0.046 0.049 0.045 0.046 0.049 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.108) (0.105) (0.109) (0.109) 
5. Number of risk factors -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
6. Underwriter reputation 0.405 0.382 0.374 0.367 0.358 0.331 
 (0.250) (0.249) (0.236) (0.250) (0.233) (0.215) 
7. Year 2000 -0.450+ -0.430+ -0.452+ -0.471* -0.421+ -0.486* 
 (0.210) (0.211) (0.215) (0.192) (0.216) (0.201) 
8. High-tech industry 0.048* 0.051* 0.046* 0.056* 0.049+ 0.047 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.031) 
9. Cultural distance 0.414** 0.408** 0.416** 0.403** 0.394** 0.396** 
 (0.082) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.079) (0.080) 
10. Top four auditors 0.040 0.029 0.024 0.029 0.035 0.029 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.032) (0.038) 
11. Independent director ratio -0.001 0.004 -0.010 0.009 0.008 -0.004 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047) (0.036) (0.053) 
12. Dual leadership 0.015 0.016 0.020 0.016 0.016 0.022 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) 
13. Market return 0.774 0.769 0.714 0.743 0.683 0.585 
 (0.600) (0.625) (0.599) (0.637) (0.633) (0.612) 
14. US sales ratio -0.120 -0.117 -0.100 -0.129 -0.128 -0.122 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.123) (0.114) (0.120) (0.113) 
15. Ownership retained by 
non-independent directors 
0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
16. VC retained ownership  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
17. Investor protection -0.047 -0.043 -0.036 -0.041 -0.035 -0.022 
 (0.059) (0.062) (0.069) (0.061) (0.060) (0.068) 
18. Returnee executive directors 0.035 0.028 0.019 0.024 0.035 0.022 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) 
19.Returnee independent directors  0.055* 0.187** 0.140** 0.151** 0.398** 
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a 
Sample size: 232; standard errors are in parentheses. All models include industry, 
year of lising, and home country dummies. 
b
 + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (0.025) (0.060) (0.046) (0.034) (0.079) 
20. Returnee independent 
directors*Ownership retained by 
non-independent directors 
  -0.003**   -0.004* 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
21. Returnee independent 
directors* 
VC retained ownership 
   -0.004+  -0.004+ 
    (0.002)  (0.002) 
22. Returnee independent 
directors* 
Investor protection 
    -0.058** -0.065* 
     (0.019) (0.024) 
    0.336 0.337 0.346 0.342 0.343 0.361 
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Table 4 Factors affecting foreign IPOs’ percent price premium: Address the issue of 
multicollenairty
a,b
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.486 0.446 0.335 0.506 0.466 0.402 
 (0.468) (0.457) (0.448) (0.460) (0.446) (0.441) 
1. Firm age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
2. Market capitalization 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
3. Past financial performance 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.006 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
4. International sales 0.047 0.046 0.049 0.045 0.046 0.049 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.107) (0.104) (0.107) (0.108) 
5. Number of risk factors -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
6. Underwriter reputation 0.400 0.375 0.373 0.359 0.350 0.328 
 (0.246) (0.246) (0.235) (0.248) (0.229) (0.213) 
7. Year 2000 -0.447* -0.424+ -0.454+ -0.465* -0.413+ -0.486* 
 (0.203) (0.205) (0.212) (0.186) (0.212) (0.202) 
8. High-tech industry 0.052* 0.054* 0.048* 0.058* 0.052* 0.050 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030) 
9. Cultural distance 0.401** 0.398** 0.408** 0.396** 0.383** 0.389** 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.075) (0.077) (0.076) (0.074) 
10. Top four auditors 0.041 0.029 0.024 0.028 0.034 0.029 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.033) (0.037) 
11. Dual leadership 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.021 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020) 
12. Market return 0.768 0.764 0.710 0.737 0.683 0.582 
 (0.610) (0.632) (0.607) (0.641) (0.644) (0.620) 
13. US sales ratio -0.115 -0.113 -0.098 -0.125 -0.122 -0.119 
 (0.116) (0.118) (0.122) (0.112) (0.116) (0.114) 
14. Ownership retained by 
non-independent directors 
0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
15. VC retained ownership  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
16. Investor protection -0.052 -0.047 -0.038 -0.044 -0.040 -0.025 
 (0.059) (0.062) (0.069) (0.061) (0.060) (0.068) 
17.Returnee independent directors  0.060* 0.195** 0.146** 0.149** 0.406** 
  (0.024) (0.057) (0.043) (0.031) (0.074) 
18. Returnee independent 
directors*Ownership retained by 
non-independent directors 
  -0.003**   -0.004** 
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a 
Sample size: 232;  standard errors are in parentheses. All models include industry, 
year of lising, and home country dummies. 
b
 + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
19. Returnee independent 
directors* 
VC retained ownership 
   -0.004+  -0.004+ 
    (0.002)  (0.002) 
20. Returnee independent 
directors* 
Investor protection 
    -0.053** -0.062* 
     (0.017) (0.025) 
    0.341 0.344 0.354 0.350 0.348 0.368 
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Table 5 Factors affecting foreign IPOs’ percent price premium: Drop firms listed in 
bubble period
a,b
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.802 0.766 0.679 0.820 -0.234 -0.268 
 (0.494) (0.474) (0.477) (0.483) (0.490) (0.530) 
1. Firm age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
2. Market capitalization 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) 
3. Past financial performance 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
4. International sales 0.061 0.060 0.063 0.059 0.061 0.064 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.121) (0.117) (0.120) (0.122) 
5. Number of risk factors -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
6. Underwriter reputation 0.546* 0.528+ 0.514* 0.517+ 0.507* 0.478* 
 (0.245) (0.245) (0.236) (0.242) (0.231) (0.210) 
7. Year 2000 0.050* 0.052* 0.047* 0.056* 0.050* 0.049 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) 
8. High-tech industry 0.042 0.047 0.044 0.053 0.458** 0.457** 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.043) (0.068) (0.072) 
9. Cultural distance 0.027 0.016 0.009 0.016 0.022 0.015 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.047) (0.039) (0.047) 
10. Top four auditors -0.012 -0.005 -0.019 -0.000 0.003 -0.007 
 (0.048) (0.041) (0.049) (0.042) (0.042) (0.057) 
11. Independent director ratio 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.018 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) 
12. Dual leadership 0.843 0.852 0.804 0.817 0.766 0.666 
 (0.641) (0.666) (0.644) (0.687) (0.675) (0.670) 
13. Market return -0.185 -0.185 -0.164 -0.193+ -0.200+ -0.188 
 (0.116) (0.114) (0.122) (0.106) (0.112) (0.111) 
14. US sales ratio 0.001 0.000 0.001+ 0.000 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
15. Ownership retained by 
non-independent directors 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
16. VC retained ownership  0.117* 0.117* 0.124* 0.111* 0.298** 0.298** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) (0.072) (0.075) 
17. Investor protection 0.047* 0.042+ 0.034 0.035+ 0.049+ 0.035 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023) 
18. Returnee executive directors  0.061* 0.189* 0.134* 0.156** 0.385** 
  (0.026) (0.063) (0.047) (0.034) (0.089) 
19.Returnee independent directors   -0.003*   -0.004* 
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a 
Sample size: 232;  standard errors are in parentheses. All models include industry, 
year of lising, and home country dummies. 
b
 + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
20. Returnee independent 
directors*Ownership retained by 
non-independent directors 
   -0.004+  -0.003 
    (0.002)  (0.002) 
21. Returnee independent 
directors* 
VC retained ownership 
    -0.058* -0.066* 
     (0.020) (0.029) 
22. Returnee independent 
directors* 
Investor protection 
    -0.058** -0.065* 
     (0.019) (0.024) 
    0.341 0.344 0.352 0.346 0.349 0.362 
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Figure 1 A model of the impact of returnee independent director on foreign IPOs’ 
percent price premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Interaction effect between returnee independent directors and retained 
ownership by non-independent directors 
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Figure 3 Interaction effect between returnee independent directors and retained 
ownership by venture capitalists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Interaction effect between returnee independent directors and investor 
protection 
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